



SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
IRVINE, CALIFORNIA 92717

January 17, 1984

Dear Dan:

Enclosed is my efforts to "edit" part of your first UCI lecture (which I found most provocative and enjoyable).

I confess that I was at a loss as to what to do since no guidelines were given to me. Who was the audience for this written version - you, the students, the faculty? Should I omit your ~~x~~ references to the students? If not, what shall we do to make student questions from the floor clearer so that they can be transcribed?

I did not complete the script because I felt that you would want to give us clear indications of what you would like (or not like).

I consider this merely a first cut. Probably it would be best to do it on the word processor. At any rate, please let us know what you would like us to do. If you would like me to continue along the lines outlined in the enclosed sample, I ~~k~~ would be happy to do it - or anything that would be satisfactory to you.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Judith Stanley".

Judith Stanley
Aide (Voluntary) to Margolis

1/9/84

~~He's going to put this on me while I have a chance to study the reading list here. (PAUSE) Is this for sound or just for recording? Both. It's interesting.~~

I was sitting here watching this ^{course syllabus} being passed out and remembering a course I attended once at Harvard Summer School that made an enormous impression of an opening statement. It was a French scholar, very...gee I've forgotten his name...very sexy looking guy actually. Harvard Summer School was filled with teachers, mainly women teachers from all over the country. And he had a marvelous description of his course which was on Kleist I remember, and Helderlean, this extremely romantic description, very long and so the place was packed like this. I was sitting in there and he came in, sat down, looked very continental and he was absolutely silent. Didn't look disorganized like me. Just sat there for quite a while, like this. (PAUSE) It was a total silence in the room. Finally he leaned forward and said in rather a high voice, French accent, to a woman in the front row. "May I see the catalog please?" And she handed it to him and he studied this marvelous course description and said, and then he launched into a very brilliant and apparently extemporaneous lecture which...I was very impressed by that so I was tempted to ask someone.

The subject of this course, ^{the title is actually taken from a book} ~~the title is actually taken from a book~~ by Henry Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, I find, after I ^{the title of a} finished this final reading list, or next to final reading list, last

~~Although~~ ^{have} ~~night, that I had not put Kissinger's...any of his works on this reading~~ ^{list} ~~list. Oddly enough, and there is more from Herman Kahn. I'll talk about~~ ~~the reading list later. We're going to have a break, I'll talk for about~~ ~~an hour and then we'll take a break. And in the second hour among other~~ ~~things I want to talk about the reading list. Last night ??? I switched~~ ~~some of it from REQUIRED to RECOMMENDED to cut down the total load~~
 although Julie Margolis just informed me that I'd switched just the wrong ^{LET ME BEGIN WITH A QUESTION T-Ray} ~~things so we'll have to talk about that. Including Herman Kahn. One of~~
^{Kahn's} ~~Herman's, his second book, with the title, Thinking About the Unthinkable,~~
~~starts with the comment which I think is a quote from someone else,~~
 "Thermonuclear war is unthinkable, but it is not impossible and therefore
 we must think about it."

Well, let's start with some good news. Edward Teller, New York ^{stated} ~~Times~~, January 3rd 1984. ~~Last week.~~ Palo Alto, California. ~~It begins,~~
 "About 40 million Americans are likely to survive a worst case
 large-scale nuclear attack, even without any protective measures." There
 is another report ^{which} ~~we are going to be talking about later that comes out,~~
^{the latest issue} ~~has come out in Science, this latest issue, and in the latest issue of~~
~~Foreign Affairs which is on the Required Reading for today by Carl Sagan,~~
~~which starts out that a nuclear war will kill, or the latest studies up~~
~~until the study he is reporting, the National Academy of Sciences study~~
^{propaganda} ~~indicated~~ that a thermonuclear war would kill at least 1.1 billion people
 and wound another 1.1 billion ~~or...adding to half the world's~~
 population. And it goes on to say, ^{is primarily} ~~so much for the immediate casualties,~~
 but what this study ^{is primarily} ~~concerns~~ is what will the world be like for the

survivors. And that's mostly bad news. But I thought that Teller's ~~Statement~~ opening here shows the different way of looking at these things. Its that glass half full ~~or~~ half empty phenomenon, ~~you know, repeated.~~ About 40 million Americans are likely to survive a worst case large-scale nuclear attack. Of course for many years, Teller, who until recently, has liked to be called the father of the H-bomb, has been bringing this news to us. That at least half the world's population would survive the experience of his baby--of an H-bomb, of a thermonuclear war--rather than focusing on the number that would die.

Let me give you another piece of good news. ~~Actually since this didn't seem to cheer you up as much as I hoped it would.~~ This is Richard Nixon's birthday. All right? Right. ~~I didn't know that this morning in San Francisco, I got that from your local papers here, The Los Angeles Times.~~ He's ~~more~~ remembered here in Orange County it seems. It's his seventy-first birthday and ~~as a matter of fact it's appropriate that we should celebrate his birthday which, that...~~⁹ ~~the fact that it's his birthday is not a secret, I believe.~~ ~~But~~ ^{But} it is appropriate that he should be remembered by this class on this day because in fact it's an earlier secret of Richard Nixon's which is the genesis of this course. At least it's a secret I'm about to reveal, ~~I suspect, to you,~~ although it has been available for some years now, but I have a feeling that most people, unless they've read something by me or heard me before, are not aware of it. ~~An appropriate thing to celebrate on someone's birthday.~~ That is how Richard Nixon almost won a war. And since we seem on the way to entering a very similar war, or a couple of them in this year, ~~coming~~

up, this is a good time to find out what Richard Nixon's secret plan to win the Viet Nam war actually was.

But let me see if this is unnecessary for you. I'm going to spend a large part of a lecture later on on this subject so I'm not going to go into detail. But let's see if you know it already. ~~I learned that secret and then followed up on it, some years ago, but years after the event,~~ ^I in a memoir put out by his Chief of Staff, H.R. Bob Haldeman, ~~who~~ ^{he} revealed that Nixon, ~~in fact,~~ had had a secret plan to win the war, ~~And~~ that it was essentially the same plan that his former boss Dwight Eisenhower had used to win, or end, the Korean War. Now I want to ask, then, this group right now, and please don't be falsely modest or silent, ~~Let me see hands on this.~~ How many know what Haldeman was talking about in terms of Nixon's plan to win the war? How many do not? OK. ~~Get the complement here.~~ How about the reference to Eisenhower? I'll give you the exact way that Haldeman talks about it. ~~Well, he says that Haldeman was going to do it...said that Nixon planned to do it the way that~~ Eisenhower had ended the Korean War. How many people know what he is referring to there? Or think you know? Let's see how many...Take a look around, how many. And again, how many do not? Here's somebody who had his hand up both times. How did you know that? Oh, OK, Hersh. How many people have read Hersh's book by the way? That's very...that's true, you'll see that I have assigned in the recommended reading, some large passages in Hersh that do give you in some detail, that story. Let me ask two more questions to see where we are as we start on this course before I give the answers to the first two parts of the quiz.

Price
of
Power

Tom
Reifer
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The theme of the course as described in the catalog is "What are U.S. nuclear weapons for?" How many would accept this as a reasonable statement of the purpose of nuclear weapons as seen by United States presidents and public? It's essentially a quote from a ^{my former boss, and a} past (my former boss) Secretary of Defense, Robert MacNamara in another article that is ^{he states that} on the required list in foreign affairs recently. ^M Nuclear weapons have no other purpose, no other use, than to deter their use by an opponent. ⁴ Essentially to threaten to retaliate to, and thus to deter, or if necessary to retaliate to, the use of nuclear weapons on the United States by an enemy. How many here would recognize that as your understanding of what nuclear weapons are for, or have been for? That's about half as I see it. How many would disagree with that? Interesting. About half, or less, not everybody answered. That's a changed proportion that I've found in the last couple of years. If I asked that question as I have even three or four years ago I think nearly everybody would have been in the first category.

Those of your who answered differently may have been educated by Reagan's responses to the second question, last question, fourth question. Does the United States have ^a ~~a tacit or formal~~ either tacit or formal policy that it will NOT initiate the use of nuclear weapons? An effective no first use policy. How many would say that in your understanding we do have such a policy in practice? Hum. All right. One last time, how many would not? Now, I'll just pick one at random here. What, why would you think not? May I ask you?

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A: Yes. I've heard that a people say that Reagan made a statement that we would not make the first strike, that unintelligible

You heard Reagan say that we would not do a first strike. Let me be a little more precise. We're going to talk about the terms "first strike" that this woman just used, and I'm going to distinguish that from "first use," and I'll get to the definitions in a moment, but I'm speaking now quite generally. Not necessarily about hitting Moscow, but about initiating the use of nuclear weapons, perhaps tactical nuclear weapons under any circumstances. In case there was a confusion about that, is it your understanding that Reagan is or is not prepared under some circumstances as a matter of policy to initiate the use of some nuclear weapons if necessary?

A: It is my understanding...

That he would.

A: Yeah.

Even though, as I understood you before, you felt that he would not, that he has said he would not.

A: ?

You think he might have his fingers crossed on that one, is that right?

A: That's and I'm not sure that I heard him say that but I ??

Any other answers on why you think we do not have a no-first-use policy?

A: Am I correct in thinking that ??

OK. Could you hear that by the way? Can you hear these answers? Yes, you are correct. It has been our ^{FORMAL} policy with respect to NATO as a formal ~~executive commitment~~ to initiate the use of nuclear weapons in the event of a large scale conventional attack, or to define it differently, an attack that NATO conventional or nonnuclear forces could not stop. It has been assumed militarily and politically from the beginning of NATO that that means almost any major attack by the Soviet Union in the NATO area, at least one in which they persisted in the face of the risk that they would face nuclear weapons we are committed actually to carry out ~~commitment~~ to initiate the use at least of tactical nuclear weapons. And if those do not stop the Soviets we are committed to escalate that up to what I will later define as a "first strike," an all-out strategic attack ^{against} on the Soviet Union on its homeland, on its ability to retaliate against the United States. So we have had both a "first use" policy in the sense of a threat to use short-range tactical battlefields nuclear weapons, so-called small, ~~relatively smaller~~, tactical nuclear weapons, and also a

"first strike" policy where I use that to refer to the initiation of attacks by one superpower against the homeland of the other. And it's understood that such an attack on a large scale would in particular seek to disarm, or reduce the damage which the opponent or the victim could wage in return against the homeland of the attacker. Yes?

Q: ??

The political commitment, ~~which is~~ ^{among the signatories} a signed treaty in NATO is that any member ~~of NATO~~ ^{this is a} will treat an attack on any other member as an attack on itself. ~~Very strong,~~ very strong commitment. It is not a commitment to consult, nor to consider what we should do, ~~it is~~ ^{it} to treat that attack as if it were an attack on ourselves, requiring, ~~presumably,~~ ^{may} a military response. And when I say that our nuclear commitment goes beyond that, I'm speaking now of the military planning which is approved by the President and by the other heads of state of the NATO countries, and is reflected in presidential speeches and Secretary of Defense speeches to the NATO heads of state, often in classified speeches. I wrote one of the annual classified top-secret policy speeches for MacNamara. ~~But~~ also in public statements. To summarize this, ~~then, and I'll work~~ through these questions backwards, then, the United States does NOT have a no first use policy. The United States has a first use policy ~~in the~~ ^{any} sense of ~~in some cases stated,~~ explicit, binding commitments to initiate the use of nuclear weapons against an opponent who has not used nuclear weapons. ~~But~~ who has perhaps attacked in other ways. ~~Although it is not~~

limited to that necessarily. For example, the United States does not rule out a so-called preemptive attack which is a use of nuclear weapons in the anticipation that we, or our allies are about to be attacked. And that doesn't necessarily mean about to be attacked with nuclear weapons. It could mean about to be attacked with non-nuclear weapons with perhaps the likelihood that that would escalate as the word is, ~~expand~~ to the use of nuclear weapons ~~eventually~~. In other words, we don't ^{formally} rule out ~~formally~~ that we would initiate the use of nuclear weapons in advance of any fighting at all. Although, let me introduce a further distinction ~~that we will be referring to. I'll distinguish~~ that from preventive war, which would be an attack by non nuclear or nuclear weapons well in advance of any expected hostilities. ~~Not~~ in the presence of hostilities, ~~not~~ in the expectation that hostilities are about to commence. It might take place, ~~one could imagine that happening~~, because one expected that ~~sooner or later~~ at some less favorable time, hostilities might start and it was preferable to do it now. Nations have often undertaken war for that purpose.

Preventive war, nonnuclear or nuclear, is not a part of U.S. public policy, nor to my ~~quite well informed~~ knowledge, a part of our secret policy. I have to make this proviso of "to my knowledge", ^{because} we're talking now about matters which if they were matters of secret policy would of course be very secret and ^{therefore} could be quite unknown. ^{then} For example, to the President. If such plans existed. ~~And that is not a joke, as we will see.~~ But I can say that at quite high levels, secret policy statements have ruled out the notion of preventive war in that sense. But that is

all that is ruled out. ~~Either in American planning or policy or in~~
~~actual consideration. And when presidents have occasionally said, as~~
~~this woman mentioned, and she has, I am sure heard statements and not~~
~~only by Reagan about this, that the United States would not strike first,~~
~~that is truthful only to the extent, the misleading extent, to which it~~
~~refers to this concept of preventive war. It does not rule out a~~
~~preemptive attack which as I said is undertaken in the special~~
~~circumstances of the belief that you are about to be attacked, or an~~
~~attack may actually be under way at that moment, but the warheads have~~
~~not yet arrived, let us say, or the troops have not yet arrived. That is~~
~~not ruled out. Nor is the initiation of nuclear weapons ruled out. And~~
~~when I call that first use, or when I call the initiation of strategic~~
~~attacks first strike, the word first there does not imply that I am~~
~~talking about the initiation of hostilities. In fact in most cases it~~
~~will not mean that. I don't...it not only doesn't necessarily mean that,~~
~~I will not be talking about that for practical purposes in this course.~~
~~Nearly everything we'll be talking about contemplates the possibility~~
~~that the United States will choose to escalate an ongoing conflict, a non~~
~~nuclear conflict, but being the first to use nuclear weapons and I don't~~
~~by the way--first use is not only a U.S. possibility, it could be Soviet~~
~~first use, It could be, it appears, Israeli first use, it could be~~
~~English, and so forth. But it means that in those various cases.~~

Likewise a first strike could constitute such even if a nuclear war
 were already going on. Imagine something that Reagan did talk about. A
 nuclear war which had been up to a certain point confined to Europe. A

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possibility which almost...a statement by Reagan of a possibility, which statement came close to creating the antiwar, antinuclear movement in Europe on a large scale. As they heard a U.S. President assert the possibility in his eyes of a nuclear war that would be limited to Europe.

I'm saying that out of such a war an attack by the United States on the Soviet Union coming in advance of any Soviet attack on the U.S. would be, in my terms, a first strike, a first strategic strike. It's just a technical term, but think of it then as a first strike against the homeland. Are those distinctions clear, then? So far?

Q:

I'm sorry?

Q: ??

According to our commitment. Are you saying? It has been...what the Europeans were reacting to was, that it has been the...it was the understanding at the beginning of the NATO planning, ^{in the early} going back to 1950's and the early 50s, that really the first escalation of nuclear weapons in those days was thought to be against the homeland of the Soviet Union. In fact, at the very beginning around 1950 there were no so-called tactical nuclear weapons, that is short range weapons whose use would be confined to the European, East Europe or West Europe. Our only weapons were quite large weapons carried by long range planes at that time mostly

based in Europe but which were aimed at the Soviet Union. So the understanding of the U.S. nuclear commitment was a first strike, first use you might say. I'm going over these things in a way I hope to make the distinctions clear in your mind. First use in those days then would have been first strike. There was no real distinction. Later, tactical nuclear weapons were introduced in fairly large numbers by about 1954, and

19 55. And at that point the use of tactical nuclear weapons was thought to be not a substitute for the use of the Strategic Air Command bombers but rather an accompaniment to it. The tactical nuclear weapons in cannons, in atomic demolition munitions, buried nuclear mines in the ground and in various other forms, were thought to be for the purpose of holding and destroying Soviet armies in East Europe while SAC demolished their lines of supply and specifically demolished their homeland. Keep them out of Europe. I'll go a little more into that strategy, but they were not then thought of as something you use before you use SAC but as something you use along with SAC.

By the late 50s the Soviets had acquired large numbers of tactical and intermediate range missiles. The missiles of the range of the SS-20 that we have heard so much about in the last few years came in in 1959 and 1960, in fact in larger numbers of missiles than we now have SS-20s with the same range and with much larger warheads. It got up to about 700 of what are called intermediate range ballistic missiles, range roughly 1,000, 1,500 miles. Early in the course here for the benefit for at least some of you I'll try to spell out as many of these terms as I can. If I miss, please raise your hands and let me know. So that's in

contrast to the intercontinental ballistic missile whose range tends to be 5 or 6 thousand miles or more. Submarine missiles started at about 1,000 miles and are now getting up to intercontinental range but of course they come... ^{but... classified as} so they are intermediate range missiles ~~but they are~~ based, of course at sea, and are close enough to the Soviet Union to target it.

There were, as I say, some seven hundred intermediate range missiles in the Soviet Union by the early 1960s. Herbert York, who was the first director of Livermore Labs, ^{where he was} Teller's boss at Livermore as a young man, and then first director of research and engineering in the Defense Department and in charge of the Ballistic Missile Program. ~~I'll be referring to him~~ a number of times. ~~Wrote an article with a chart in it showing the~~ number of one megaton warheads necessary to destroy all life in the open ^{using a} in each country in Europe. ^{he estimated} And it was a simplified calculation, based on ~~sort of the optimum number of warheads and assuming, just for simplicity,~~ that people did not take cover, and so forth, but how many warheads it would take to kill everyone by fallout alone, ignoring blast and fire and other effects, ~~so~~ ignoring the effects of hitting cities, just looking at the fallout that would be created by groundburst weapons of one megaton size. Now that was a warhead yield ~~not picked out of the air because~~ that was the yield of the SS-5 and no, what were the numbers? SS-5, yes, ^{which had} SS-4 and SS-5, the intermediate range missiles had one megaton warheads. One megaton warheads mean that they have the equivalent in explosive yield of one million tons of TNT. That's a measurement not of their fallout but of their explosive power. And one million tons of TNT is

half the tonnage that was dropped in all of WW II. So each of these warheads have the equivalent of a half WW II on it.

The figure for Germany was 160 such warheads to kill all life in the open. For some countries, Luxembourg, it was a handful. For Britain, not very many. For Norway which doesn't have a large population, but is ~~narrow and~~ long and skinny and mountainous, it took more--a fairly large number.

Germany was one of the higher ones. ~~was~~ 160. They had 700. Mostly targeted on Germany. So, NATO plans finally changed a little bit in the late 60s under strong pressure from Mac Namarra in hopes of avoiding if necessary the early use of nuclear weapons by building up non-nuclear defenses by which to meet a Soviet advance into Germany and then to limit as much as possible the use of nuclear weapons, if nuclear weapons were still necessary. Mac Namarra you may be aware has recently come out for a no first use policy, that is a commitment by the United States that we would not under any circumstances initiate the use of nuclear weapons. But as, ~~and~~ he has announced, ~~that~~ ^{and} this was his private belief ^{and} which he shared with the President, John F. Kennedy, at the time that he was Secretary of Defense. A belief that the United States should not, and so far as they were in control and concern, would not initiate the use of nuclear weapons. But he did not announce that to the Europeans or to the Soviets at the time or to the U.S. military, for reasons we will go into later. He announced quite the contrary in speeches, indeed, which I wrote in some cases under his guidelines, ^{we} emphasized that if necessary of ~~course~~ we would carry out our NATO commitments to initiate the use of nuclear weapons. And to make that threat credible to the Soviets, and

more explicitly to our allies, that we would indeed initiate the use of nuclear weapons if our non nuclear defenses were failing. It was Mac Namarra who presided over the movement to Europe of the major part of the seven thousand warheads which were there by the late 60s. Most of these warheads were what Goldwater in 1964 in his campaign called "small conventional nuclear weapons." They were Hiroshima-sized nuclear weapons which were indeed much much smaller than the megaton warheads of the SS-4s and 5s. They averaged, then, about 20 kilotons. That's 20 thousand tons of TNT equivalent, or the tonnage, the explosive yield of the weapon that killed 200,000 people in Hiroshima and likewise in Nagasaki.

~~Is there a way of getting water, by the way? Will somebody volunteer?~~

So the weapons went over there. In fact, you'll see in his foreign affairs article that ^{MC NAMARRA} Mac Namarra, ~~later in the course, that Mac Namarra~~ ^{was} says that the placement of those weapons ~~is, in fact,~~ quite dangerous--they could be overrun by the Soviets very early. That would put, in turn, great pressure on our commanders to use them before they lost them. Or perhaps to save themselves from tactical defeat by annihilating advancing tanks or advancing enemy ^{through} by the use of those weapons, even if they were not authorized, ~~possibly.~~ Especially in conditions where they were out of communication and so forth. That created a situation of instability, where things could get out of control. The weapons might be used even though the leaders of NATO

including the President might not want them used at that point. ~~Why~~^{Since}
~~might they not want them used?~~ Well, the use of them would, as Mac
 Namarra says, almost surely quote "escalate" to the use of the
 intermediate range weapons which have now been modernized to the SS-20, to
 the use of our own weapons and to the annihilation of all life in Europe
 as a first step toward intercontinental attacks.

There might seem a paradox in the real pressure by our governmental
 allies in NATO to be sure that we are ready to and would initiate the use
 of nuclear war. Since ~~the mid sixties~~—since actually the late 50s, the
 alliance has been a suicide pact for Europe and East Europe, the Warsaw
 Pact and West Europe if commitments were carried out. It is a commitment
~~to commit what will come~~ to what Herman Kahn called mutual homicide ~~on a~~⁹
~~Very large scale.~~ But ~~(thank you) the fact remains, to finish the answer~~
~~now, to the question, which was asked earlier.~~ The fact remains that
 NATO policy did change in 1967 to allow the possibility that the first
 response to a Soviet overwhelming attack that was breaking through western
 defences would not include strategic attacks on the Soviet Union, but
 would involve tactical nuclear weapons and/or intermediate range nuclear
 weapons such as our forward based airplanes in that area or missiles of
 the sort we are now putting over there.

(Change tape side)

The reason that Reagan's reference to that possibility, then, hit
 Europe so strongly was that most Europeans simply had not heard ~~that~~^{of}

change. What they ought to think of it, once they heard it, is another matter we'll get into it. But the fact is that Reagan's mention of the possibility that the war might be limited to Europe if the Soviets backed off under those circumstances--after we'd used nuclear weapons. That came to the Europeans as a surprise and an implication that we were changing the rules, changing our commitment in a way that seemed to them extremely unpleasant. It sounded as though it would be ~~less deterrent of~~ the Soviet Union since it might not involve attacks on the Soviet Union, less able ~~then~~ to prevent or deter Soviet advance into Europe. And at the same time might make the U.S. President more willing to initiate the use of nuclear weapons in hopes that it would remain limited to Europe. So on both counts it seemed to make their destruction not greater, but more likely. And that logic had a fair amount of merit. But it was not something that Reagan had introduced.

In most of the cases where we will be talking about Reagan's policies we are talking about policies that in fact he did not initiate, but in which he has played the extremely useful role of exposing or leaking to the public. Indeed, I say useful, in from my perspective. I think that if Reagan does not, in fact, destroy the world, he may well proved to have saved it because his reckless candor on our actual policies, which he is simply maintaining and continuing, has been indispensable in creating and mobilizing a world public reaction which is certainly indispensable to changing these policies. So if we live through them we may well look back and thank God that Richard, that Reagan (laughter) Richard...get back to Richard, spilled the beans. Yes?

Q:??

The French strategy?

Q: ??

Defense strategy...what are you referring to there?

Q:??

Well...Can I put? I don't quite understand. Let's talk about that afterwards, hon. I don't quite understand your question. Let me get it straight.

Let me carry on with the relation of this to the questions I began with. As I said we do not have a no first use policy. We have a first use policy. Second, let me say, U.S. nuclear weapons are not primarily for the purpose of deterring nuclear attack on the United States, and never have been. And when I say primarily I'm speaking of the purposes that motivate and rationalize the acquisition in any given year of new weapons. And I'm saying the bulk of new weapons in any given year from the beginning, have always been motivated by motives other than the deterrence of an attack on the United States by the Soviet Union. If I remember the answer on that the class was about evenly divided. Now see, that, too is a fairly big change. I would say even a few years ago nearly everyone would have believed that Mac Namara was simply stating

U.S. policy in practice as well as in form, in describing the only purpose of nuclear weapons as being to deter nuclear attack on the United States. If Mac Namarra had said, "That is what the purpose should be seen as, other purposes should be as true. The implementation of other purposes should be avoided and recogn..." that would be something else and I would agree with that. You cannot understand, in my opinion, U.S. policy with respect to the arms race or the relation of nuclear weapons to our foreign policy, if you believe that most presidents, or in fact any presidents, have seen the value and purposes of nuclear weapons as Mac Namarra described them in the quote that I gave. If you are to suppose that presidents have believed that nuclear weapons were for no other purpose than to deter nuclear attack, you would not be able usefully, I believe, to understand why they have bought as many weapons as they have, or the kinds of weapons that they have, and why they are still buying them, and...or what it is that they actually see in those weapons. And that applies to the two presidents which Mac Namarra served, and to all the others. What I mean by that will emerge somewhat tonight and certainly will be the theme of this course. But by saying that, some of you might recognize that I am challenging the prevailing interpretation of the arms race by most of its critics, both in let us say the freeze movement, or in the establishment arms control circles, the Salk II proponents, and so forth. The prevailing understanding has been that of course nuclear weapons were just to deter nuclear attack, from that point of view of the critics they clearly are excessive in terms of the needs--the requirements--for deterring nuclear attack. And

what is to be explained, then, is a phenomenon of waste, of excess. To be explained by inertia, by service rivalries, by the profits of the firms that make these weapons, by peculiar ideologies that have no basis in evidence or reality, ~~And~~ that essentially are determined below the level of the President.

The process is seen as one out of control of the President in the sense that the President has very little coherent purpose for buying these weapons, it is as if some time ago the President subscribed to a "missile-of-the-month" club. ~~And...~~from the laboratories, for example. And his secretary pays the bills and these weapons just keep coming from the laboratories with bonuses like the MX or Pershing or something occasionally, and they pile up on the shelf unused and unusable. And I would say that... ~~And~~ how do we then deal with that? How do we shut off that flow? That understanding, I believe, leads in directions that are unfruitful, certainly the efforts of the arms controllers, as of the arms abolitionists have been unfruitful. And I think the lack of success in affecting policy has in part reflected an inadequate understanding of what the arms race is about in the eyes of the Presidents and others. I'm saying that I believe there is, in fact, more coherent purpose which in turn is more strongly based upon experience and evidence and reasoned argument than these arms controllers assume, or know, even if they were at quite high levels of the government as some of them were. Like Herb York, or ??????Yakowski, or Pete Scovill and others. In almost no case did these high level critics know war plans, know the proposed use of these weapons which happens to be the field that I did find myself in in

the late fifties and early sixties. My expertise in the design of nuclear weapons. ~~Those characteristics~~ is zero except what I've picked up as necessary for my job, but in terms of how Presidents and joint chiefs of staff proposed to use the weapons, I do have a kind of knowledge which not many people do have and which I plan to share with you in this course. That's the major purpose of it.

~~Even so, and~~ I speak now as somebody who ^{essentially} wrote the war plan essentially in 1961, who drafted the first Kennedy Administration general nuclear war plan. Which ~~in fact~~ ^{as the war plan} served officially for more than ten years ~~as the war plan I now learn from some of these references,~~ and still influences war planning. And in this context I bring that up to say I nevertheless had a lot to learn about what those weapons were for, and learned some of it only recently. ~~Because, even to me, if I can say that--and~~ I had a dozen clearances higher than top secret in the early ^{and even to me} sixties--these things were secrets ~~from me, and from other people.~~ And specifically, the answer to Haldeman's...the question I asked about Haldeman's point, was a secret. And it was learning that that led to the framework and the subject matter of this course. So let me turn to that.

~~I read in Haldeman's book, and this is now, I'm reading from a footnote to uh--you don't have to take it down--but it's a footnote to my paper "Call To Mutiny" which is in some ways an overview of the course, and I'll be following it in this lecture tonight. That's why I assigned it in the first lecture.~~

In Haldeman's memoirs which came out in 1978, pretty late in the game, he said this. "When Nixon spoke of his desire to be a peacemaker

he was not just delivering words his listeners wanted to hear." It occurs to me, by the way, that when I speak of a secret plan to win the war a lot of you didn't hear that, exactly. How many actually remember 1968 and the campaign of '68 and the implications by Nixon that he had a secret plan to win the war. Fair number. But a lot of you obviously...I'm sorry?

Q: ??

A good question. To win the war or end the war. He actually...he used both words, and I'm going to get in a later lecture exactly what he had in mind. Either, one can imagine his using either word as a matter of fact. He did not plan to win it in the extremely ambitious sense that my former boss Johnson had hoped to win it at a certain point. From that point of view he had scaled down his ambitions. But he did plan to achieve an outcome that ~~Johnson by 1967 or 8 would have~~, would have exceeded Johnson's wildest dreams, ^{by 1967 or 1968} and would have perceived as a win. Not any longer to destroy the Communist Party of Viet Nam, South or North and have a totally peaceful countryside under the sway of our Saigon regime, the so-called GVN or Government of Viet Nam, but rather to achieve a situation in which the government of Viet Nam, the Saigon regime, would be able to hold at least the major cities, Saigon and the major province capitals and district capitals of Viet Nam indefinitely with very low U.S. costs and U.S. casualties, even though large parts of the countryside might not be under their control. But they would have

brought the war down to a level then when they could handle with their own Arvin South Vietnamese forces, supported by U.S. money and...~~I'll mention, this is as Hersh brings out very clearly a secret part of the plan...~~the potential of U.S. air support indefinitely, but eventually, he hoped, without U.S. ground support.

He came very close to achieving that goal. But as I say that's for a later lecture. I want just to mention now what his plan for achieving it actually was, and that's another secret. He was absolutely convinced he would end it his first year. ^{Haldeman recalls that} ~~I remember~~ during the campaign walking along a beach he once said, "I'm the one man in this country who can do it, Bob." He saw ^a parallel in the action President Eisenhower had taken to end another war. When Eisenhower arrived in the White House the Korean War was stalemated. Eisenhower ended the impasse in a hurry. Now we're getting to my other question, "How did Eisenhower end it?" He secretly got word to the Chinese that he would drop nuclear bombs on North Korea (one could add China) unless a truce was signed immediately. In a few weeks the Chinese called for a truce and the Korean War ended. Let me ask again. How many people are familiar with that account of the ending of the Korean War in 1953? And how many are not? Well, let me tell you, it's worth looking around when you raise the hands because I want you to have a sense of whether you are alone in not knowing something at a given moment or whether on the other hand, if you do know it whether it's something that everyone knows or not. That account is a pretty good paraphrase of Eisenhower's own public account some seven years after the event when he published his memoirs 24 years ago in

1960. You can see a pretty good section of Eisenhower's account of that again in the footnotes to "Call to Mutiny" and I won't go into it because it's pretty well paraphrased by Haldeman there. That is how Eisenhower believed he had ended the war, or asserted that he had ended the war. His chief of staff, his Haldeman, Sherman Adams, at the time once asked Eisenhower after the event what had led the Chinese to accept the peace terms and to keep them. And (~~I'm having trouble finding it, well, quote from memory~~) Eisenhower answered him, "Only their knowledge that we would use nuclear weapons."

Now I want you to reflect on the fact that most of you didn't know that. Didn't know what? Didn't know that Eisenhower said that. And by all accounts of people at the time who were around him Adams, Nixon, Twining, others--believed it. That's worth knowing. One reason you perhaps don't know it is, I ~~have the impression~~ that most historians that read that at the time passed it off as improbable or implausible. They could see other reasons the war had ended. Stalin had just died. The international situation had changed enormously. One could think of other motives for the Chinese to end it. Eisenhower was not in fact asking very much of the Chinese--although more than they had granted up to that time at ~~Pan Mun John~~ ^{PAN MON JOY}. And they did not take seriously the notion that nuclear weapons could have been seriously threatened at that time or would have been effective. They seem to have passed over very quickly, the implications of the apparent fact that our President had made the threat and believed that it had been effective.

One can well assume that if you think that you have ended a war that way, you will use such threats in the future. And Eisenhower did. One

person who did was his Vice-President, Richard Nixon. Haldeman goes on "In the fifties, Eisenhower's military background had convinced the Communists that he was sincere in his threat. Nixon didn't have that background ^{and so had} the problem of making the threat credible. But he believed his hardline anticommunist rhetoric of 20 years would serve to convince the North Vietnamese equally as well that he really meant to do what he said. He expected to utilize the same principle of the threat of excessive force. He would combine that threat with more generous offers of financial aid to the North Vietnamese than they had ever received before ~~and with this~~ (which he did offer, but did not carry out) and with this combination of a strong warning plus unprecedented generosity, he was certain he could force the North Vietnamese at long last into legitimate peace negotiations, ^{where} into accepting his terms. ~~They were negotiating at that point. But accepting his terms: which were in fact~~ that the North Vietnamese should remove all of their regular North Vietnamese forces from the south. Something they never did do and did not accept to do under this threat. The threat was the key. And Nixon coined a phrase for his theory which I am sure will bring smiles of delight to Nixon haters everywhere.

We were walking along a foggy beach after a long day of speech writing. He said, "I call it the Madman Theory, Bob. I want the North Vietnamese to believe I reached the point where I might do anything to stop the war. We'll just slip the word to them that 'for God's sake, you know Nixon is obsessed about Communism. We can't restrain him when he's angry. And he has his hand on the nuclear button. And Ho Chi Minh

*Is this
a direct
quote from
Haldeman?*

himself will be in Paris in two days begging for peace.'" He goes on to say as it turned out it didn't work out. But the threat was given, in fact, as Hersh finally brings out in considerable detail. ^{And} But as I learned, ^{from} ~~by asking people from~~ the White House staff, after I read that in Haldeman's memoires.

I had written the first options paper for Kissinger and Nixon in December of '68, January of '69. The first paper considered by the National Security Council on any subject. And then ~~later~~...immediately after that, ~~a~~ study called "National Security Memorandum 1." The first study memorandum ^{posting} ~~with~~ a series of questions to the various services to answer on prospects in Viet Nam. I had retained my contacts ~~through~~, in '69, and later, with the White House staff. And when I read that in Haldeman, there was something in it which rang true, ~~suddenly~~, although it was a complete surprise to me. ~~Which I'll come to later.~~ And I took that seriously. I was one of the few who did, possibly. I may also have been the only person who read Haldeman's ^{both} ~~memoires~~ ^{+ H. Ford's memoires}. Unless he read them. ~~Which...so, likewise Nixon's memoires.~~ So I looked into it. And that led a bit further. ~~It was clear that I had not learned of this.~~ There were types of secrecy which went beyond what even I'd experienced. I would have assumed that I would have heard something of that from the people who had worked on those plans, who had turned against the war, and whom I'd known, later, both in the government and later in the antiwar movement. And it led me to raise the question, "If I didn't know that, ~~if I didn't know that~~, having worked on strategic war planning, what else don't I know about this history?" And I began to look at what the public

record had to show. Of course one of the first things I ran into then was the public memoirs of Eisenhower, as ^{these} I say, confirmed, and now ^{further} confirmed by declassified documents ~~that~~ have come out showing the secret policy discussions of that period and war planning of that period.

By that time then it was not surprising that what had worked for Eisenhower in 1953 was not the last time that Eisenhower used that tactic. It was not the only memory that Vice President Richard Nixon had to go on when he finally entered the White House. Korea was in 1953 when those threats were made. ^{On} 1954 ~~the~~ United States through Radfo... Chief of Staff, Chairman of the Joints Chiefs, Radford and through Secretary of the State, John Foster Dulles offered the French three or more tactical nuclear weapons for use against China and the immediate environs of their troops--the French troops--surrounded at Dien Bien ^{PHU} ~~Phoo~~ in ~~Northern~~, North Viet Nam to save them. The French in that case turned down the offer. They felt that the Chinese Communists ~~were~~, or rather the North Vietnamese Communists, were too close to their own troops at that point ^{and} they would have endangered their own troops if they had used our offered weapons. We were ready to make that experiment, but the French chose not to and they turned down our offer of one or more weapons to use against Communist China which was supplying the Vietnamese, on the grounds that that would have "incalculable consequences" meaning, for France. In 1954, ~~in fact~~, the Soviets had almost no capability to reach the United States with strategic delivery power but as I've mentioned, they were acquiring the capability to reach France or other countries. Indeed a year earlier Eisenhower had mentioned that his one concern about having

Consistency

to carry out the threat in Korea was that the Russians, ^{supporting} behind the North Koreans, might retaliate against Japan again. And he said he was fairly anguished about this possibility, not ^{quite enough} so much as to tell the Japanese that this prospect was in store, or to modify his threat, ~~but he saw it as a genuine possibility.~~ So Bidot's worry a year later of retaliation against the French, would not have appeared absurd to our own President.

In 1955 threats ^{were made} were of nuclear weapons, against China in connection with the ~~the~~ dispute over the Techun Islands in the offshore islands off Communist China. And the Chinese backed off. In 1958 the Chinese Communists began to shell the Island of Quemoy, a few miles off mainland China, on which Chiang had placed a third of his combat troops, apparently in preparation for an invasion of the island or a total blockade of the island which would lead to its downfall, and possibly then to the downfall of the Taiwan regime. As you will see in the study, ^{study, assigned to you,} ~~assigned to you~~ ^{written} study by Morton Halperin, on this occasion President Eisenhower ended by ^{ed} authorizing the Joint Chiefs to ~~assume--to plan on--the~~ use of nuclear weapons against the Chinese mainland immediately if there was an impending invasion or an ongoing invasion of the offshore island and, if necessary, to break a blockade of the island if that blockade were successful. ~~To break it by attacking the artillery positions on the~~ Chinese mainland.

This is the clearest ~~cut~~ case of a definite ~~clearcut~~ commitment by a President to use nuclear weapons if an opponent did what it was expected to do at that point in an impending ongoing crisis situation. In effect the trigger on armed nuclear weapons in the Pacific ^{at least} ~~at least~~, was passed

to the Chinese. And they passed in effect. They backed off, and reduced their blockade by artillery to every other day. ~~In fact allowing them the ships a face saving way of retreating so that the blockade was broken.~~ In effect, ^{it} was not necessary to use nuclear weapons.

In 1960 Eisenhower's ^{final?} last advice to the incoming President Kennedy in early 1961 was that it might well be necessary for him to send troops to a conflict in Laos. And Kennedy did face that prospect with the ^{war plans and} Joint Chiefs he had inherited from Eisenhower ~~and the war plans that he inherited from Eisenhower,~~ and these Chiefs pointed out to him, as can be seen in memoirs of Sorenson (which I think I'll add to the recommended reading) ^{were sent} that ~~if those troops were...if we sent~~ U.S. troops, as they recommended, into Laos, which is a landlocked country, it was possible that they could be cut off. Airfields could be overrun, they could be surrounded with no possibility of resupply. In that case it would be necessary to use nuclear weapons to protect them. This was in general true if either the North Vietnamese ^{or the Chinese} entered the conflict in Laos ~~or the Chinese entered the conflict.~~ We would need to use nuclear weapons against either of those enemies since our troops would easily be overwhelmed. ^{The J. Chiefs} Kennedy...~~they~~ wanted a commitment in advance ^{from} to Kennedy that those weapons would be used and in fact delegated to the commanders in the field. He did not give such a delegation. ~~He did not turn...~~ But ^{reject such?} he did not ~~turn off~~ the planning. He did go into negotiations which led to an outcome that was adequate for him. So again that was not tested. ^{exactly?} But he did not ~~reject~~ the advice of the Joint Chiefs that he should ^{send} put the troops in ~~but that he should do that in their opinion only with a~~

commitment, or an understanding at least, that he would use nuclear weapons if necessary.

You'll find in my "Call to Mutiny" that I didn't include that particular episode in the list I gave of instances in which U.S. Presidents have seriously considered the possible imminent use--first use--of U.S. nuclear weapons. We did not send the troops. Kennedy did not make a clearcut commitment. I didn't put it in that list. The list does comprise instances in the administration of every President from Harry Truman to Reagan, with the exception of Ford, who was in ^{office for a} shorter ~~time~~ than any of the others. And what that list does include, then, are the instances, some of which I've just mentioned to you, in which in ongoing crises the President did seriously consider the possible immediate use if necessary of nuclear weapons and in many of which cases he actually threatened them, ^{making} ~~Made~~ that known either by newspaper leaks or direct communications to the opponents.

To finish the list quickly, in 1961 there was what I called in my list a public crisis--the Berlin Crisis--which invoked, of course, NATO planning ~~that we've been discussing~~ which was well known to the Europeans at least, ^{and} ~~to involve~~ the commitment of first use of nuclear weapons if necessary. In '62, ^{there was} the Cuban Missile Crisis in which President Kennedy judged, ~~we learned later~~, the possibility of war--general war, nuclear war--^{to be} ~~being~~ somewhere between one third and one half. In 1964 (and again I think I'll add this reference to the recommended reading--I want to put in there so you can look it up a good part of the publicly available literature, at least for your reference) you'll find in the Pentagon

Papers discussion as early as '64 ^{on} of the possible later use of nuclear weapons in Viet Nam, though that wouldn't come into this list because it was a contingency kind of discussion. But in 1968 an incident ~~that~~ ^{QUESAN} does make the list where Marines were surrounded at Kason in ~~Northern~~...South Viet Nam and ~~were there~~ were newspaper leaks of Presidential consideration of ~~the possible necessity~~ ^{to use nuclear weapons} and those leaks were in fact correct. ~~Kason did not~~ ^{QUESAN} was not in fact attacked, unlike Dien Bien Phoo. ^{PHU} I ~~find it easy to believe~~ ^{SUSPECT} that those published threats had a good deal to do with that, and that this does ~~in fact~~ ^{OUTCOME} again represent a victory for Lyndon Johnson of ~~the sort that...~~ ^{TACTICAL} a tactical victory...of the sort that Eisenhower ^{thought he} had had in 1953, or ~~thought he had~~ ^{he face of}.

In 1969 as I've just mentioned, President Nixon did in fact make ^{made} threats of the possible use of nuclear weapons ~~in the fall of 1969~~. And we'll go into that in some detail later. Again, he made those threats apparently in '71 and '72. And in '73 a crisis which has recently been studied in some detail by Barry ^{BLECHMAN} Bleckman (which is on your reading list) ^{occurred} in the Middle East War of 1973, the American nuclear alert widely believed at the time to be an aspect of American domestic politics--distracting attention from the so-called Saturday Night Massacre which had just occurred, turns out to have been, as Kissinger asserted, very passionately at the time, an act of international diplomacy, a genuine threat of possible nuclear war.

Finally, ~~in~~ the Carter doctrine, in 1980 after the invasion by the Russians of Afganistan, was explained by White House ~~officials~~ and defense officials at the time as being a threat to initiate nuclear war if

necessary. And ~~that~~ ^{that} that was the concrete meaning of Carter's more careful public statement that we would use any means necessary. It didn't take much to read nuclear weapons into that statement if you imagined that Carter ^{was} ~~were~~ sincere, ~~in that~~, because we're talking, ~~of course~~, about a part of the world which ^{was} ~~was in 1980, and is today, and was for a long time before that,~~ a long ways ~~from home~~ from the United States, and on the border of the Soviet Union.

Defense Department studies which have always indicated, and which were leaked to the public for the first time in 1980, that the Defense Department regarded it as necessary to use nuclear weapons if there was a major mve into Iran, did not reflect the well publicized advantage of the Soviet draft and the Soviet army over the United States forces which are smaller and have no draft. This Carter doctrine commitment was actually made in a speech in which Carter asked for draft registration. There was a lot of discussion on the draft at that time. But the need to use nuclear weapons had little to do with the fact that you are not presently being drafted. If we drafted women, children, and old people, the fact remains that the Soviets would outnumber us twenty-to-one in that area on their borders. We are no more able to deal unilaterally with the Soviets on their borders such as Turkey or Iran, than the Soviets with their larger army would be able to keep us from the gas or oil of Mexico or China with non nuclear means alone. The possible necessity of using nuclear weapons in that area follows only from our perceived right and need to protect "U.S. interests" or U.S.-backed regimes in that area thousands of miles from our home bases and on the borders of the Soviet

Union. And I can say that the plans we heard about in 1980 were simply the same that I had seen exercised in war games at Rand and elsewhere in the late fifties.

These plans were reasserted by Reagan in his...in '81 then in his first days in office where he almost repeated the words of Harold Brown to the outgoing Secretary of Defense a month earlier who had said in his last press conference, "What keeps the Soviets out of Iran militarily is the fear of World War III." Reagan used almost the same words a month later in an interview.

World War III started by whom? We are talking about nuclear war now, not just the start of conflict. Who would be the first to use nuclear weapons in Iran. The Soviet Union? With, as the studies indicated, its twenty-to-one superiority in that area? Not really. That's not why we were sending our carriers armed with nuclear weapons to the Indian Ocean and to the Persian Gulf and searching for bases in that area. It was a threat slightly veiled of U.S. first use of nuclear weapons by Carter and Reagan. And veiled or not, that is the reality of our war planning.

To go back a bit. In 196...I...well, now let me rather characterize this whole pattern. I repeat. Every President from Truman to Reagan, with the possible exception of Ford, has found himself in a situation where he has used nuclear weapons. Used them in the sense that you use a gun when you point it at somebody's head in a confrontation, or you prepare to do that and you load it for that purpose. Whether or not you pull the trigger. If you get your way, if the other person backs off without your pulling the trigger, that is the best possible use of the

gun. That's basically what you bought it for. And that's what Presidents use their nuclear guns for and it's why they buy them.

They learn what we on the whole do not learn so clearly. That their predecessors have found a need to use that threat, have had occasion to do so, and that it has often worked in their terms. It has done...the threat has done what they wanted. It has worked. They have a difficult job, it's a hard world, as they keep telling us. And none of those Presidents, who have differed a good deal in their attitudes towards force and U.S. policies in the world, none of them has found himself willing to divest himself of that instrument of policy. I'm not suggesting that any President has wanted a nuclear war--any of them--from Truman to Reagan. And to be quite specific, I do not believe that Reagan wants a small or large nuclear war, any more than any of the others. But all of them have wanted to threaten nuclear war if necessary. All of them have felt the need to back up our interventionary forces with the threat of initiating nuclear war at some level if necessary and the threat to escalate that war if the Soviets should respond to it as they have the physical capability of doing.

This brings in a second major point I want to make about the relation of nuclear weapons to our foreign policy. I've implied that at least the tactical nuclear weapons have in fact served effectively in most cases to support and back up our expeditionary forces. Our marines, our airborne, or our allies forces in administration after administration, but if that were all that were involved, there would hardly seem to be a necessity for most of the weapons we have and especially the larger ones. That

refers to the fact of the characteristics of the opponents that I've just described.

To show how little this pattern is appreciated, let me mention a quote by Herman Kahn here in his book on thermonuclear war which was written in 1959, published in 1960. Quote on page 240, "There is one wartime control measure that already exists: a ban on the use of atomic weapons in minor conflicts." Herman's discussion of the need for a first use policy as well as a threat policy refers almost entirely to NATO and I think a couple of the people who commented here did reveal a very common understanding of those who understand that we have a first use policy. They believe that it refers to NATO and nowhere else. Evidently that is false from the examples I've just given. Herman went on to say in '59 "Official statements to the contrary," and then he underlines this, it's in italics rather, "it would be almost unthinkable" (we'll take a break here in a minute) "it would be almost unthinkable for the United States or the Soviet Union to use atomic weapons against a small country that did not possess atomic weapons." Now you'll notice that in almost every case the threats, with the exception of Cuba and Berlin, the threats were made against countries that did not have nuclear weapons, as was our first use of nuclear weapons--against Japan. Clearly that's safer to do and has not been found to be unthinkable, illegitimate, or unnecessary. When he says it is unthinkable, almost unthinkable, you know Herman, for Herman to say something is unthinkable is quite impressive. But he might be glad to know he was wrong, even there. He says, "it would be almost unthinkable to use this against a small country

that did not possess atomic weapons. Only a few government officials do not realize this," he says. Well they included every President, unfortunately, and so these small countries did not fail to experience those threats. Would they have been carried out?

When one looks at the planning, one looks at the presidential statements and knows the statements about them, it is very hard to believe what most people did believe at the time. They were bluffing. But then the presidents knew something that most of us in the public did not know at that time--another thing. They had a near monopoly of nuclear weapons even against the Soviet Union during most of that period. As the fifties wore on there was no longer, of course, a physical monopoly of nuclear weapons, but the Soviet delivery capability was almost exclusively against Europe or Japan and surrounding countries.

They had in 1961 exactly 194 intercontinental bombers that could reach the United States on two-way missions with refueling. The U.S. had 3,000 bombers in range of Russia. ^{and} ~~The Soviet Union, rather the U.S. had 200 warheads within range of the Soviet Union, at that time.~~ Over 100 intermediate range missiles, ~~of our own at that time,~~ like the Pershings we're putting in now into Europe, ~~and~~ about 48 Polaris warheads at sea, about 40 Atlas and ^{yes} Titan warheads in this country, about 200. The Soviets at that time of course, ^{had only 4} ~~could reach the United States with~~ ^{capable of reaching the U.S.} missiles only of intercontinental range--ICBMs. They had 4 at that time. That was, by the way, and is, top secret, as far as the government is concerned.

I'm declassifying that for you without authorization in the belief that it is not too early for you to know, 24 years later, now, 23 years

later, what the reality was behind the alleged missile gap on which Kennedy campaigned a year earlier in 1960. The assertions of Democratic leaders and leaked from the Air Force and CIA ~~at that time~~, were that the Soviets would have some hundreds of missiles in 1960 or '61, leading up to many thousands by the mid-sixties. When I was at SAC headquarters in ~~1960~~ in August of 1961, just at the height of the Berlin Crisis, the same month as the Berlin Wall was installed, and before the new estimate appeared, ~~the~~...I was told by the Chief of War Plans that the Commander of SAC, Thomas Power, assessed the ~~?????~~ ~~officially at that time~~ that the Soviets had 1,000 missiles. They had 4. He was wrong by 250 times, not 250 percent, 250 times wrong, ^a Considerable error. ~~But~~ the CIA estimate had been several hundred, ~~earlier~~, at that point. The most recent estimate was lower than that, it was something like 120 to 160, ^{wrong} long only by 40 or so times.

Let me go back to the ~~threat that I...~~ ^{unthreatened} the use that was made of our nuclear weapons in 1961. ^{On recent times} MacNamara and McGeorge Bundy have both asserted quite vociferously, ~~in recent times, in connection with their own assertion that we should eschew nuclear weapons, first use, that Kennedy would never have used nuclear weapons first.~~ How many of you have heard that? In fact. Are you familiar with that? You're not familiar with that assertion. I can say in fact that when I first said some of the things I'm just saying now I was in the presence of McGeorge Bundy who had been, ~~I should explain, the National...~~ the Assistant for National Security, the Henry Kissinger position of the Kennedy Administration. And he had been really quite friendly in the course of

this talk that I was giving until I made the assertion that ~~I said that~~ every President had made such threats. And ~~(Julius will be interested in~~ ~~this anecdote, perhaps)~~ this was in a colloquium in honor of Bernard ^{Brodie} ~~Body~~ that was taking place ~~down~~ in Los Angeles, and he went red in the face, at that point. He's a man who never...doesn't lose his cool very easily. And he actually pounded the table and he said, "I worked for two of those Presidents and I can assert flatly that that was untrue for the Presidents that I worked for. They never considered such a thing." And I was quite taken aback by this. What I actually was thinking of at that moment was the Laos situation, but of course, Berlin, Cuba, could have been mentioned. And I spent some time talking to Bundy later and thinking about what could lead him to believe that what he had just said was true, which he obviously very sincerely did. Now he has revealed, of course, part of that. The secret...I should say MacNamara has revealed the secret that Kennedy had agreed with MacNamara in conversation that it was his intent never in fact to launch nuclear weapons first under any circumstances. But of course that's not what I was saying. And not even what I was interested in. The issue was, had he used them in the sense that I have described? Had he relied on threat? Well, we'll go into those studies, but it should be fairly selfevident what that answer is, although it was obviously not evident to McGeorge Bundy who has a reason of his own not to want to perceive ^{what} that I would say. But let me remind ^{ask} you, just before the break, one last question. A lot of you were not alive I guess at that time. Some of you were, though, pretty young. Let me see how many in this audience recall that President Kennedy in July of

1961 made a (you won't be called out). By the way you're not going to be held too accountable for dates and minutia in this course in terms of the reading, let me tell you that right now. There's going to be a lot of names and a lot of dates

(change from Tape 1 side 2 to Tape 2 side 1)

...have fallout shelters by private enterprise, by the end of the year. You should provide yourself with fallout shelters because of possible thermonuclear war over Berlin." This in connection with his calling up of reserves, putting SAC on alert, sending additional troops to Europe and asserting our determination to use any means necessary to protect Berlin. How many people here remember that policy? Raise your hands. I...well, its a young, it really is a fairly young audience, but let me, wait, let me see the hands a little more...can I? Some of you weren't too old. How old were you then?

A: ??

In '61? How old were you in '61?

A: ?? (laughter)

Yeah, but not to be invidious, I couldn't answer that question if...ah...